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From the Legal Literature
Highlighting the Failure of Criminal Courts
to Adequately Test Machine Evidence
Francesca Laguardia, J.D., Ph.D.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The risks modern technology poses to traditional understandings
of Fourth Amendment privacy protections is a well explored topic.1
However, recently, scholars have become aware of another risk
posed by increasing technological advances to our traditional
understandings of criminal law and criminal justice. Although
technological advances have generally increased the accuracy of
the criminal justice process,2 their treatment at trial introduces opportunities for the jury to hear misleading or outright false information without the traditional safeguards that the rules of evidence and
Confrontation Clause3 protections have offered. Today, machines
regularly provide evidence, and while that evidence may carry many
of the same risks of inaccuracy or outright falsehood that witness
statements carry,4 machine evidence generally evades the scrutiny
to which we subject more traditional forms of evidence.5 But how
can juries evaluate the credibility of a machine? What new protocols
are necessary, and to what extent are the rules of evidence failing in
regards to these new forms of evidence? This issue is only beginning to receive recognition. The following are two articles that have
begun mapping the problem.
1

See, e.g., Katherine Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011); Michael
Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 164 (2015); Lauren Fash, Automated License Plate
Readers: The Difficult Balance of Solving Crime and Protecting Individual Privacy,
78 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2019).
2

Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L. J. 1972, 1976 (2017).

3

U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124
S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 63 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1077 (2004) (holding that
out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial are barred, under the
Confrontation Clause, unless witnesses are unavailable and defendants had prior
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, regardless of whether such statements are
deemed reliable by court).
4

Roth, supra note 2, at 1989–93; Brian Sites, Machines Ascendant: Robots
and the Rules of Evidence, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 21–23 (2018).
5

Sites, supra note 4, at 5–6.
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II. Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L. J. 1972
(2017).
While the problem of the increasingly routine use of technologically complex evidence has been percolating for over a dozen years,6
the first scholar to zero in on this problem at the trial level is Andrea
Roth. In her article in the Yale Law Journal, Roth has explored the
position of machine evidence at trial, as compared to a routine
witness. As Roth notes, more and more often machines offer assertions of truth, whether as to the location of an individual at time of
arrest, the level of alcohol in an individual’s bloodstream, or the
proper interpretation of DNA panels.7 These assertions, she argues,
carry dangers similar to the hearsay dangers of human sources of
evidence, which she enumerates as insincerity, ambiguity, memory
loss, and misperception.8 She refers to the respective dangers present in the case of machine testimony as “black box dangers,” which,
she states, are not present in all machine testimony, but when present may go unnoticed and unexamined by the jury.9
Roth first explains the issue of machine credibility. While some
courts have suggested that machines merely convey the assertions
of their programmers, she states, in truth many machines now make
statements—even testimonial statements—that their programmers
or the analysis using the machines could never have independently
affirmed or denied.10 While acknowledging that information from a
programmer may be useful when evaluating machine conclusions,
she suggests that a better comparison is to experts (with the
machines as the experts) who may well rely on witnesses or other
input to come to conclusions but nevertheless come to their own
conclusion.11
But the philosophical questions of whether a machine makes
independent assertions or has independent thought are less relevant
to the question of fairness and accuracy at trial than the possible errors that machine sources are allowed to bring into a trial. It is to
these errors that Roth turns next. She notes the possibility of falsehood by design (which might be compared to a witness who lies on
the stand)—these may occur for instance when a programmer or
designer purposefully designs a machine to give false or misleading
6

Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721 (2007); Erin Murphy,
The Mismatch Between Twenty-First Century Forensic Evidence and Our Antiquated
Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633 (2014).
7

Roth, supra note 2, at 1971–72.

8

Roth, supra note 2, at 1977.

9

Roth, supra note 2, at 1977–79.

10

Roth, supra note 2, at 1986–87.

11

Roth, supra note 2, at 1987–88.

162

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 56 No. 1

FROM THE LEGAL LITERATURE
statements (Roth uses the example of Volkswagen’s misleading
emissions evaluations).12 Additionally, machine learning allows for
the possibility that machines would learn to lie in order to achieve a
desired outcome. This has been achieved in some machines,
although none currently used in criminal proceedings.13 She also
notes the possibility that a machine can be inarticulate or misleading
due to imprecise language, for instance if insufficient information is
given as to the conditions under which the machine comes to its
conclusions. At what percentage of certainty does the machine state
it has found an answer? What potential errors exist? What level of
toleration for false positives or false negatives has the programmer
used? If answers to questions such as these are not available, the
machine might be considered “inarticulate,” as in: it is difficult to
state precisely what the machine is saying.14 These ambiguities may
also stem from human mistake in using the machine, or the degradation of the machine over time.15
Similarly, degradation or human mistake can create a machine
that miscodes, misreads, or analyzes material incorrectly. 1 6
Unconscious bias by a programmer may lead to an algorithm that
relies on that bias to determine what is most likely, or what is most
reliable—in the case of legal analysis, such bias has led less popular
precedents to all but disappear from some legal research.17 Machine
learning can lead to overfitting—assuming a relationship exists
simply because a coincidental pattern has been found (as an
example, Roth offers a crime analysis program that taught itself that
people “who shak[e] hands three times [are] likely engaged in a drug
transaction.”).18 And of course, any machine that relies on a human
to input material may provide flawed results when the operator of
the machine operates it or inputs material incorrectly, such as by
waiting too long to run a test, or inputting the wrong sample.19
Not all machine evidence brings in questions of credibility, so Roth
spends Section II breaking down which types of evidence might
raise these problems and which most likely would not.20 Implicit in
her analysis is an analogy to hearsay determinations. Machines
whose statements are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted
12

Roth, supra note 2, at 1990.

13

Roth, supra note 2, at 1992.

14

Roth, supra note 2, at 1992–93.

15

Roth, supra note 2, at 1993.

16

Roth, supra note 2, at 1994–95, 1999.

17

Roth, supra note 2, at 1995–96.

18

Roth, supra note 2, at 1996–97

19

Roth, supra note 2, at 1998–99.

20

Roth, supra note 2, at 2000–21.
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do not present credibility issues, she states, including as an example
the read out from a printer that is presented only to show that the
printer was working, not for the truth of whatever the document
said.21 Similarly, she excuses tape recorders as mere “conduits” for
someone else’s statements, while in contrast transcription services
may include errors and therefore should not necessarily be trusted
as easily.22 Finally, some machines may be only tools—such as
magnifying glasses or the Thermal Cycler that copies DNA in order
to aid in testing.23
Roth suggests that the machines above may be distinguished
from machines that analyze or interpret evidence on their own, and
therefore require analysis of credibility (such as a meaningful opportunity to cross examine or impeach the machine).24 In contrast,
she presents machines that do require credibility because they make
independent statements that are taken for truth. Here Roth takes
something of a historical view, beginning with machine statements
that have, wrongly (she implies), been accepted without sufficient
testing of credibility. These include photographs, which may include
conscious or subconscious bias and manipulation; basic instruments
such as clocks and thermometers, which may be susceptible to
operators’ error or manipulation but whose credibility is rarely
questioned; computerized business records; and litigation software.25
The technology appearing in court has become more and more
advanced. And as it has advanced, it has exhibited a “creeping
concealedness,” by offering more and more internal steps (such as
completing the math a technician would once have completed and
then testified to, matching fingerprints, or determining whether the
amount of debris at a scene suggests a fire caused by arson).26 As
more and more steps are completed by machine, cross examination
or impeachment of a human witness, or of the statement in general,
becomes less and less possible. The machine cannot be cross
examined, and structures are not in place to facilitate impeachment.
Defendants may not even be able to question the process by which
the machine comes to its conclusion, because the software may be
proprietary.27
As machines play more and more of an independent role in gathering and analyzing evidence, Roth suggests that jurors need more
21

Roth, supra note 2, at 2001.

22

Roth, supra note 2, at 2002.

23

Roth, supra note 2, at 2003.

24

Roth, supra note 2, at 2005.

25

Roth, supra note 2, at 2007–15.

26

Roth, supra note 2, at 2016–17.

27

Roth, supra note 2, at 2018.
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context in order to evaluate how credible that analysis is.28 In Section III, Roth offers a number of suggestions as to how to better
restrict machine evidence and allow for more effective testing of the
credibility of that evidence. She suggests front-end solutions, such
as requiring any software used in litigation to maintain specific
industry standards not only in design of the machines but in regular
testing of the machine’s accuracy.29 She also recommends that
software be open-source, so that it may be researched and tested
by the public (or interested parties), and suggests that a public
advisory committee might oversee key standards in proprietary
software (such as what level of certainty is required before DNA
software determines it has found a match or ruled one out). 30
Similarly, Roth recommends pretrial disclosure of the machine’s
source code so that any errors in the program can be discovered, or
at least access to the ‘‘ ‘basic principles’ underlying the machine’s
methods” in the case of proprietary software, and possibly pretrial
access to test the machine itself.31 Roth notes that typical authentication requirements for live testimony are often ignored in the case of
machines, and even the use of Daubert and Frye reliability tests,
when applied, fail to test the accuracy of machine testimony (another
reason to require disclosure of information about the machine’s
source code).32 Roth further recommends that any prior runs or near
matches provided by the machine be disclosed to defense counsel.33
But, as noted above, the credibility of many machine’s conclusions relies on the responsible behavior of the programmers and
technicians using the machine. Roth therefore suggests not only
impeachment of the machine (through the machines prior statements and/or pretrial testing of the machine as described above),
but also the possibility of impeaching the machine’s programmer or
any person who had to input information into the machine in order to
28

Roth, supra note 2, at 2023.

29

Roth, supra note 2, at 2022–24

30

Roth, supra note 2, at 2026.

31

Roth, supra note 2, at 2028.

32

Roth, supra note 2, at 2033–35; compare Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014, 34
A.L.R. 145 (App. D.C. 1923) (holding that expert opinion based on a scientific
technique is inadmissible unless the technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in
the relevant scientific community); with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200, Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 13494, 37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 20979 (1993)
(reasoning that Frye’s general acceptance standard was overruled by the Federal
Rules of Evidence and holding that the admissibility of such testimony turns on
whether the underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly
can be applied to the facts at issue).
33

Roth, supra note 2, at 2029.
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get a result (as required in the United Kingdom).34 While such
requirements are not made of human experts, human experts can
be cross examined. The inability to cross examine machines, Roth
suggests, might make testimony from machine operators more
necessary.35
Finally, Roth turns to the Confrontation Clause, and here the crux
of the article really becomes evident. She states, “[i]f the Clause is
concerned with unreliable, unconfronted testimony, then credibilitydependent claims that are likely unreliable and offered against the
accused at trial should pose constitutional problems, particularly if
the defendant does not have the opportunity to impeach the
source.”36 To fix this problem, Roth advocates for a right to meaningful impeachment of machine testimony—whether by examination of
a source code, testimony by a programmer upon any updates to
software, or written responses to relevant questions (such as “what
threshold do you use in deciding what to call a genetic marker versus
‘noise’?”)37 While not all impeachment or examination need happen
in the courtroom, Roth reminds us that offering machine analysis
without the ability to test that analysis may severely harm a
defendant’s rights to challenge the evidence presented against him.
III. Brian Sites, Machines Ascendant: Robots and the Rules of
Evidence, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1 (2018).
In 2017, Andrea Roth suggested several remedies for scrutinizing
the credibility of machine evidence. In 2018, Brian Sites surveyed
judicial resolutions of arguments regarding machine evidence in
order to assure us that Roth’s suggestions have not been implemented, nor have any other mechanisms for judging the credibility of
machine testimony. Sites argues that, “[t]rial by machine is now quite
present.”38 Like Roth, Sites argues that the answer is not to exclude
machine testimony, but to add scrutiny.39 But Sites focuses on what
tact the courts have taken so far, and that tact, he explains, is to
reject Confrontation Clause scrutiny and use the Federal Rules of
34

Roth, supra note 2, at 2036 (citing Stephen Mason, Electronic Evidence, the
Presumption of Reliability and Hearsay—A Proposal, 177 CRIM. L. & JUST. WKLY.
(Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.criminallawandjustice.co.uk/features/Electronic-Evidenc
e-Presumption-Reliability-and-Hearsay---Proposal [http://perma.cc/4B9G-YLR7]).
35

Roth, supra note 2, at 2037.

36

Roth, supra note 2, at 2044

37

Roth, supra note 2, at 2050.

38

Sites, supra note 4, at 2.

39

Sites, supra note 4, at 5.
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Evidence to limit machine evidence instead. This strategy, he argues,
has fallen short.40
Sites begins with a summary of the caselaw thus far, which also
serves to further clarify the problems of machine testimony. The
courts’ general rejection of Confrontation Clause application to
machine testimony begins with United States v. Washington.41 In
that case, a defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated
based on lab analysis of a blood sample that was taken when police
pulled him over for erratic driving. The lab analysis was introduced
in court via the director of the lab, without testimony from any of the
actual technicians who performed the tests. The trial court held, and
the Fourth Circuit confirmed, not only that the defendant had no right
to cross-examine the lab technicians (he should have subpoenaed
them instead), but that doing so would offer no value because the
machines had made the statements, not the technicians.42 In short,
the Confrontation Clause could not apply to machines.43 Since that
time, Sites summarizes,
A clear pattern has emerged for claims involving machine-generated
data. Courts considering such claims have reached analogous conclusions for a variety of machines including those producing DNA results,
breathalyzer results, urinalysis results, and machine-generated data
from equipment outside the lab . . . Courts, for the most part, appear
unconcerned with the rise in number of ‘witnesses’ immune to cross
examination.44

Instead, defendants must rely on the Federal Rules of Evidence to
test the reliability of the witnesses against them, but the Rules, he
asserts, are failing in this regard. He begins, in Section II, with a
basic refresher on the relevant Rules of Evidence, including
authentication, authentication of a process or system, chain of
custody, and the requirements for expert testimony.45 He also addresses hearsay, but only briefly, to clarify that, like the Confrontation Clause, hearsay rules have been interpreted to apply only to
statements by people.46 Machine testimony is therefore excluded or,
in rare cases, may be introduced via “a lab supervisor or other such
individual testifying as a surrogate witness at trial.”47
In Section III of his article, Sites explains where the Rules have
40

Sites, supra note 4, at 5.

41

U.S. v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 74 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 332 (4th Cir. 2007);
Sites, supra note 4, at 7.
42

Sites, supra note 4, at 7–8.

43

Sites, supra note 4, at 7.

44

Sites, supra note 4, at 10.

45

Sites, supra note 4, at 12–14.

46

Sites, supra note 4, at 14.

47

Sites, supra note 4, at 15.
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proven inadequate to ensure reliability. He begins by outlining the
series of decisions in which courts have determined that machine
testimony cannot be hearsay, and that any concerns about reliability
should be addressed via authentication instead.48 Sites takes issue
with this determination, arguing that the involvement of machine
operators (for instance, determining test parameters) should render
any statement from the machine a joint statement with the operator,
and so the operator should testify.49 Moreover, he argues (citing
Roth) that machine operators may make mistakes that affect the
results and that should lead to a requirement that the operators be
present for cross examination and impeachment.50
Sites next addresses authentication. He notes that the court in
Washington, and courts following, seem unconcerned that such
damning testimony is being accepted into evidence “even where no
one with first-hand knowledge testified in court that the test results
were derived from the actual sample at issue.”51 Sites questions,
How can the proponent have “produce[d] evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is” if the only
people who know if the sample tested was the defendant’s did not
testify? How can the court know if the machine was operated correctly
on an unadulterated sample if the operator did not testify? Similarly,
how is a chain of custody demonstrated without testimony from the witness who actually analyzed the sample?52

And while Roth finds reason to question the lenient admission of
photographs, Sites argues instead that testimony from an actual
technician regarding the lab reports typically entered into evidence is
far more important. While many people may have sufficient
knowledge to verify the accuracy of a photograph, Sites argues that
only the relevant machine operators or technicians know how a test
was conducted or where a sample came from.53
Bringing together the information described above, Sites reminds
us that “machine testimony is fallible,”54 whether because it was
used incorrectly, it was intentionally tampered with, the sample was
altered incorrectly, or the analyst actively falsified results.55 Each of
these instances has occurred; Sites’ footnotes are rife with articles
from popular press or professional magazines with titles such as
48

Sites, supra note 4, at 15–17.

49

Sites, supra note 4, at 17.

50

Sites, supra note 4, at 17–18.

51

Sites, supra note 4, at 19.

52

Sites, supra note 4, at 20 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 901(a)).

53

Sites, supra note 4, at 20.

54

Sites, supra note 4, at 23.

55

Sites, supra note 4, at 21–22.
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Court: Examine if Austin Crime Lab Botched Death Penalty Evidence;
Crime Lab Uses Wrong Chemical in 2,500 Methamphetamine Tests
in Santa Clara County; How a Lab Chemist Went From ‘Superwoman’ To Disgraced Saboteur of More Than 20,000 Drug Cases;
and Another Week, Another Crime Lab Scandal.56 Each of these
scandals, from intentional tampering to accidental error, belies the
assumption that machine evidence can be trusted more easily than
witness testimony. Sites argues, therefore, that “a critical right for
defendants is the ability to challenge, through cross-examination of
the individual(s) who ran the test, whether the defendant’s actual
sample was tested and tested properly.”57
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years we have learned that we have had too much faith
in criminal forensics, as evidenced by the scandals listed above as
well as many other discoveries of inaccuracy.58 Yet, as Sites points
out, the increasing use of advanced technology is leading the courts
to accept this evidence with less oversight, and fewer opportunities
for defendants to challenge the credibility of the accusations against
them. As Roth argued that more oversight is needed, Sites adds his
voice not only to say that oversight is needed, but that the trend is in
the opposite direction. This choice to “exemp[t] nearly all machine
statements [from hearsay provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence]
is disingenuous and fails to reflect the reality . . . These or other
analytical changes—such as reinterpreting the Confrontation
Clause—are increasingly important as machine accusers aided by
human operators rise in prevalence.”59
The threat posed by this trend is a complete loss of the right to
face one’s accusers and challenge the prosecution’s evidence. As
Sites argues, “[w]hen the prosecution fills its evidence list with
machine accusers and their human supervisors . . . who have no
first-hand knowledge of the analysis allegedly conducted—how will
56

Sites, supra note 4, at 21–22, nn.130–33.

57

Sites, supra note 4, at 24.

58

Radley Balko, We Need to Fix Forensics. But How?, WASH. POST (June 20,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/20/we-need-fix-forensicshow/; Radley Balko, Two FBI Officials Say the State of Forensics Is Fine. Here’s
Why They’re Wrong. WASH. POST (June 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/n
ews/the-watch/wp/2018/06/06/two-fbi-officials-say-the-state-of-forensics-is-fine-here
s-why-theyre-wrong/; Ryan Gabrielson, The FBI Says Its Photo Analysis Is Scientific
Evidence. Scientists Disagree, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.propublica.or
g/article/with-photo-analysis-fbi-lab-continues-shaky-forensic-science-practices;
Leora Smith, How a Dubious Forensic Science Spread Like a Virus, PROPUBLICA
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://features.propublica.org/blood-spatter-analysis/herbert-macd
onell-forensic-evidence-judges-and-courts/.
59

Sites, supra note 4, at 25.
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the defendant prove the machine erred or was influenced to err?”60
At stake is only the fundamental premise of the adversarial system.
It would be better if we did not simply ignore the issue.
60

Sites, supra note 4, at 27.
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